Accelerating the transition toward low or net-zero carbon emissions is necessary to keep global warming at theoretically safe levels. That will likely bring price shocks associated with rising metal prices, energy costs, and carbon taxes – what has been called “greenflation”. Greening the economy will also require public spending and redistributive policies.
CGTN's Elaine Reyes speaks with Otaviano Canuto, a senior fellow in the global economy and development program at the Brookings Institution, about the current disruptions to the global supply chain, and how the fourth China International Import Expo seeks to address the crisis.
Scarcity of inputs and goods has been felt all over the world because of disruptions to global value chains since the beginning of the pandemic. Higher inflation has been a global phenomenon, even if with different intensities and multiple determinants. A mismatch between demand and supply can also be found in the energy price shocks. The running of supply chains in the U.S. has also been affected by an unexpected shrinkage in the workforce because of acceleration in retirements caused by the pandemic. The Fed's ‘wait-and-see attitude’—moving on to the tapering this year and likely small rises at the end of next year—is opposed by those who think the Fed is already behind.
Divergent recoveries are leaving “lasting imprints”, with emerging and developing economies suffering deeper medium-term damage than advanced countries, on average. Most countries are now forecast to have lower GDP in 2024 than projected in January 2020 before the pandemic. This is different from crises associated with industrial or financial cycles common in history because, in those cases, in general, some period of above normal or trend growth will have occurred previously. In the pandemic there has been only the loss side.
It will be necessary to accelerate the pace of global containment of carbon emissions if the expected increases in global average temperatures are to be kept below 2 or 1.5 degrees Celsius, with correspondingly less-dramatic climatic consequences. The transition to zero emissions will involve three simultaneous economic processes: change in the relative prices of goods and services, with prices starting to reflect the intensity of emissions of carbon; labor relocation; and asset value scrapping. The socioeconomic return from decarbonization must include preventing heatwaves, floods, hurricanes, droughts, floods, and storms like those of this year from becoming even more intense and frequent, the cost of which would involve even higher GDP losses for nations.
With loose money supply and low returns in the developed world, emerging markets have become the destination of choice for investors looking for high yields. However, with much uncertainty remaining and inflation well above the Federal Reserve’s target rate, speculation of Fed tapering and market tantrums are gaining momentum. OMFIF is convening a panel to look at capital flows in emerging markets, addressing what happens when the cycle turns, the likelihood of capital flows reverting and asset and currency markets in the developing world.
A new allocation of US$650 billion in Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to its member countries has entered into force last Monday. The extraordinary character of the allocation initiated this time is seen in the fact that its amount corresponds to more than double the sum of all allocations made to date. As allocations follow country IMF quotas, relief for those in need of reserves will come as an excess in other cases. The IMF set out to find ways in which countries with SDR surpluses can voluntarily channel them to those in need.
The International Monetary Fund’s tenth annual External Sector Report (ESR) shows how current account deficits in the global economy widened in 2020 during the pandemic. On the other hand, the ESR also argues that overall, the misalignment between fundamentals and current account balances has not been exacerbated.
Commercial transactions and reserves of central banks and other global public investors could strengthen the position of the Renminbi as an alternative currency to the dollar, euro, yen and pound sterling. However, the qualitative leap towards the internationalization of the Chinese currency as a full reserve currency will only happen when confidence in its convertibility is sufficient to convince unofficial (private) investors to hold much more reserves denominated in it.
The growth and productivity performance of emerging market and developing economies since the 2008 global financial crisis failed to repeat the achievements of the previous decade. Besides frustrating expectations that they might become the new growth pole in the global economy, their convergence to per capita incomes of advanced economies has suffered a setback. Nonetheless, the path of policies and reforms to be pursued in that direction remains the same. This is something accentuated by the coronavirus pandemic crisis.
There remains tremendous uncertainty and prospects of a post-pandemic recovery vary greatly across countries, as it is bound to happen at different paces. And the divergence of per capita incomes in the world is rising as an aftermath of the pandemic. The pandemic will leave scars in labor markets and income distribution, besides higher public debts as a legacy. A higher pace of automation of jobs, as well as a partial reversal of globalization are also to be expected.
Some analysts have started to speak of the possibility of a new commodity price ‘super-cycle’ after the downturn since 2011. Although it is always possible to find moments of joint fluctuation, in which commodities remain for a long time above or below their long-term trends, differences among them matter. Copper is King! It is in metals, especially copper, lithium, and rare earth ones, that a strong bullish cycle is most evident.
Commodity prices go through extended periods during which prices are well above or below their long-term price trend. The upswing phase in super cycles results from a lag between unexpected, persistent, and upward trends in commodity demand, matched with a typically slow-moving supply. Eventually, as adequate supply becomes available and demand growth slows, the cycle enters a downswing phase. The latest super-cycle of commodity prices, starting in the mid-90s, reaching a peak by the time of the global financial crisis, and getting to the bottom by 2015, can be seen as associated to the developments of globalization that we have already dealt with in this series. More recently, some analysts have spoken that we might be on the verge of a new cycle, super-cycle or not.
Financial integration of countries and financial globalization led to an extraordinary rise of foreign assets and liabilities as a share of GDP, followed by stability of total flows since the global financial crisis of 2008-2009. The apparent stability has been marked by an underlying metamorphosis of cross-border finance, with de-banking and rising foreign direct investment and non-banking financial flows. Blind spots and potential instability remain.
After peaking in 2007 at around 6% of world GDP, global current-account imbalances declined to 3% of world GDP in the last few years. But they have never left entirely the spotlight, albeit acquiring a different configuration from that which marked the trajectory prior to the global financial crisis (GFC). This is not because they threaten global financial stability, but mainly because they reveal asymmetries in adjustment and post-GFC recovery between surplus and deficit economies, and because of the risk of sparking waves of trade protectionism. They also reveal the sub-par performance of the global economy in terms of foregone product and employment, i.e. a post-crisis global economic recovery below its potential.