Bens de uso duplo, semicondutores e desglobalização
Dificultar a progressão da China na sofisticação da produção de semicondutores tornou-se peça central da política dos EUA
The Impacts of China’s Economic Reopening on Latin America
The post-‘COVID zero’ reopening of the Chinese economy has improved its growth outlook: the IMF projects 5.2% growth (2023), with declines afterward up to 3.5% in 2028. Will economic reopening and Chinese growth be strong enough to repeat previous contributions to Latin America via exports of food, minerals, and oil? This time it will be more gradual and in a different direction. Financial and investment flows will also be different.
Qual será o impacto da reabertura econômica chinesa sobre a América Latina?
A reabertura pós-COVID zero da economia chinesa melhorou suas perspectivas de crescimento: o FMI projeta crescimento de 5,2% (2023), com quedas posteriores de até 3,5% em 2028. A reabertura econômica e o crescimento chinês serão fortes o suficiente para repetir as contribuições anteriores à América Latina por meio das exportações de alimentos, minerais e petróleo? Desta vez, será mais gradual e em uma direção diferente. Os fluxos financeiros e de investimentos também serão diferentes.
Latin America in the Aftermath of Europe’s War
This chapter examines the impacts and durable consequences of Europe’s war (in Ukraine), overlapping with the effects of other components of the ‘perfect storm’ (pandemic, severe weather phenomenon, hunger, global inflation) for Latin America. First, we deal with the global tectonic shifts that have conditioned the region’s economic performance since the 1990s. Second, we outline the range of effects stemming from the ‘perfect storm’. The third section discusses how economic relations between China and Latin America have evolved. Finally, we frame the U.S.-China rivalry in a Latin American context.
The Economic Outlook and the Role of Central Banks in the Current Context of Commodities Crisis
Interview with Otaviano Canuto, Senior Fellow at the Policy Center for the New South December 14, 2022
EUA e China travam guerra por procuração nos semicondutores
Semicondutores estão no centro da atual rivalidade entre Estados Unidos e China. Dificultar a progressão da China na sofisticação da produção de semicondutores tornou-se peça central da política dos EUA em relação ao país. O caso dos semicondutores se encaixa como uma luva no que observamos nessa coluna como reversão da globalização nos segmentos de alta tecnologia considerados sensíveis desde um ponto de vista de segurança nacional. Com custos, ainda que considerados justificáveis por autoridades governamentais.
Whither China’s Economic Growth
Chinese economic figures released since August’s beginning have shown a slowdown in its growth. New Omicron coronavirus outbreaks in the context of the Covid-zero policy, the housing slump and heat waves have been decelerating the economy’s pace. China’s current growth slowdown is an additional step in the trajectory of gradually declining rates that has accompanied the “great rebalancing” since the beginning of the 2010s. One major difference now is the perception of exhaustion of waves of overinvestment in real estate and infrastructure as a lever, as compared to three previous moments since the beginning of the last decade.
Por que o crescimento chinês vem desacelerando
Números da economia chinesa divulgados desde o início do mês mostram uma desaceleração em seu crescimento. Novos surtos de Covid-19 no contexto da política de Covid zero, a queda do setor imobiliário e ondas de calor vêm segurando o ritmo da recuperação econômica do país. Há uma percepção de esgotamento da alavanca de superinvestimentos imobiliários e na infraestrutura. As autoridades chinesas estão optando por salvaguardar sua economia das vulnerabilidades financeiras, mesmo que ao preço de um crescimento do PIB abaixo das metas oficiais.
Dollar dominance will remain
The heavy financial sanctions on Russia after the invasion of Ukraine sparked speculations that the weaponization of access to reserves in dollars, euros, pounds, and yen would spark a division in the international monetary order. There has been a reduction in the degree of "dollar dominance” with the dollar's share of central bank reserves falling since the beginning of the century. The relative dominance of the dollar appears to be declining but at a very gradual pace.
A dominância do dólar vai continuar
As pesadas sanções financeiras sobre a Rússia depois da invasão da Ucrânia suscitaram especulações de que o uso armado do acesso a reservas em dólares, euros, libras e ienes iria suscitar uma divisão na ordem monetária internacional. A dominância relativa do dólar parece declinante, mas em ritmo muito gradual.
China’s renminbi needs convertibility to internationalize
Commercial transactions and reserves of central banks and other global public investors could strengthen the position of the Renminbi as an alternative currency to the dollar, euro, yen and pound sterling. However, the qualitative leap towards the internationalization of the Chinese currency as a full reserve currency will only happen when confidence in its convertibility is sufficient to convince unofficial (private) investors to hold much more reserves denominated in it.
Moeda chinesa precisa de conversibilidade para internacionalizar, escreve Otaviano Canuto
Enquanto transações comerciais e reservas de bancos centrais e outros investidores públicos globais poderão reforçar a posição do Renminbi como moeda alternativa ao dólar, euro, yen e libra esterlina, o salto qualitativo para a internacionalização da moeda chinesa como moeda reserva só ocorrerá quando a confiança em sua conversibilidade for suficiente para convencer investidores não-oficiais (privados) a guardar reservas nela denominadas.
Globalization and technological learning
Cross-border technological diffusion has contributed to rising domestic productivity levels in advanced and emerging economies and facilitated a partial reshaping of the global innovation landscape. However, there are local requisites to escalate the ladder of innovation capabilities.
China’s economic rebalancing
China’s growth trajectory in the second decade of the century has been one of a rebalancing toward a new growth pattern, one in which domestic consumption is to rise relative to investments and exports, while a drive toward consolidating local insertion up the ladder of value added in global value chains also takes place. Services should also keep rising relative to manufacturing. Declining GDP growth rates from two digits in previous decades to 6% in 2019 - and likely lower ahead – would be the counterpart to rising wages and domestic mass-consumption, and to the transition toward higher weights of services and high tech. We point out two major challenges in the rebalancing. First, the transition toward a less investment- and export-dependent growth model has been taking place from a starting point of exceptionally low consumption-to-GDP ratios. Besides high profit-to-wages ratios, low levels of public social protection and spending lead to high household savings. An additional challenge comes from the lack of progress in rebalancing between private- and state-owned enterprises, something that is taking a toll on productivity.
Climbing a High Ladder – Development in the Global Economy
This book approaches the opportunities and challenges faced by developing countries to raise their per capita income levels during the recent phase of globalization. After dealing with the post-global financial crisis economic landscape in advanced economies, it deals with the windows of opportunity opened by trade and financial globalization for developing countries to climb the income ladder. Domestic preconditions for a developing country to benefit from those windows are then pointed out. China, Brazil, and Sub-Saharan Africa are presented as case studies. The book ends with an assessment of the impact of the coronavirus crisis on the global economy.