Fourteen high-income countries have shown how immigration can help offset declining fertility rates and maintain population levels. But with anti-immigrant sentiment on the rise, politicians in these countries face a difficult choice: welcoming foreigners or facing the economic challenges brought about by an aging population.
Janet Yellen warns China against flooding the world with cheap exports of clean energy. Excess industrial capacity and government support in China's clean energy sector were discussed by US Treasury officials. The US, EU, South Korea, Japan, and Australia are implementing subsidy programs to protect their domestic industries and compete with China.
Most high-income countries will experience declines in their populations over the next few decades. Some negative consequences of aging are on the horizon: greater fiscal imbalances and risks of economic stagnation. Immigration may be a way for those countries to mitigate the tendency. On the source side of immigration flows, brain drain is a risk. The policy paper presents the case of Japan, a nation that has grappled with the consequences of a declining and aging population for several years, as an example for other countries destined to confront similar circumstances in the forthcoming decades.
When countries face external financial shocks, they must rely on financial buffers to counter such shocks. The global financial safety net is the set of institutions and arrangements that provide lines of defense for economies against such shocks. From any individual country standpoint, there are three lines of defense in their external financial safety nets: international reserves, pooled resources (swap lines and plurilateral financing arrangements), and the International Monetary Fund. We argue here that there is a need to extend and facilitate access to the ultimate global financial safety net layer: the IMF. We illustrate that by pointing out how Morocco and Mexico have boosted their defensive power by having access to IMF precautionary lines of credit.
The economic factors that have propelled global prosperity over the past three decades are losing their grip. The aging and slow growth of the global workforce are highlighted as downward factors, explaining half of the expected slowdown in potential GDP growth through 2030. What should countries do in the face of this prospect of a “lost decade”?
There is an international movement to tighten monetary and fiscal policies as a response to the global inflation phenomenon. Accordingly, global economic growth projections for 2022 and 2023 have been revised downward. As inflation will decline only gradually, given the price stickiness of its core components, there is likely to be momentarily a situation of stagflation, i.e. a combination of significant inflation and low or negative GDP growth. We discuss how the current global stagflation experience might develop into one of a soft landing, a sharp downturn, or a deep recession. The evolution will depend on how fast inflation responds downward to economic deceleration. We therefore suggest framing the response in terms of assessing to where major economies’ Phillips curves have shifted. Phillips-curve shifts will also reflect cross-border repercussions of country-specific policy choices. Furthermore, sudden abrupt deteriorations of financial conditions may cause additional moves in Phillips curves.
The heavy financial sanctions on Russia after the invasion of Ukraine sparked speculations that the weaponization of access to reserves in dollars, euros, pounds, and yen would spark a division in the international monetary order. There has been a reduction in the degree of "dollar dominance” with the dollar's share of central bank reserves falling since the beginning of the century. The relative dominance of the dollar appears to be declining but at a very gradual pace.
The war in Ukraine is bringing substantial financial, commodity price, and supply chain shocks to the global economy. Sanctions on Russia are already having a significant impact on its financial system and its economy. Price shocks will have a global impact. Energy and commodity prices—including wheat and other grains—have risen, intensifying inflationary pressures from supply chain disruptions and the recovery from the pandemic. The push toward relative deglobalization received from the pandemic will get stronger. One may expect an increasing weight of geopolitics in international payments and in the access to special commodities.
Is the growth slowdown with tightening financial conditions in advanced economies likely to be disastrous for emerging markets, with landing becoming a hard one in their case? If inflation moderates in the United States, due to reduced fiscal stimulus and fading supply chain restrictions, while growth remains minimally robust, emerging markets could avoid a hard landing. Several factors favor such a scenario.
Scarcity of inputs and goods has been felt all over the world because of disruptions to global value chains since the beginning of the pandemic. Higher inflation has been a global phenomenon, even if with different intensities and multiple determinants. A mismatch between demand and supply can also be found in the energy price shocks. The running of supply chains in the U.S. has also been affected by an unexpected shrinkage in the workforce because of acceleration in retirements caused by the pandemic. The Fed's ‘wait-and-see attitude’—moving on to the tapering this year and likely small rises at the end of next year—is opposed by those who think the Fed is already behind.
Divergent recoveries are leaving “lasting imprints”, with emerging and developing economies suffering deeper medium-term damage than advanced countries, on average. Most countries are now forecast to have lower GDP in 2024 than projected in January 2020 before the pandemic. This is different from crises associated with industrial or financial cycles common in history because, in those cases, in general, some period of above normal or trend growth will have occurred previously. In the pandemic there has been only the loss side.
A new allocation of US$650 billion in Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to its member countries has entered into force last Monday. The extraordinary character of the allocation initiated this time is seen in the fact that its amount corresponds to more than double the sum of all allocations made to date. As allocations follow country IMF quotas, relief for those in need of reserves will come as an excess in other cases. The IMF set out to find ways in which countries with SDR surpluses can voluntarily channel them to those in need.
There are three major reasons for central banks to engage on climate change issues. The first is the set of – physical and transition - risks to financial stability potentially brought about by natural disasters and trends derived from climate change. Second, the potential impact of climate change shocks and trends on economic growth and inflation and, therefore, on their monetary policy decisions. Finally, the possibility of using their balance sheets and their macroprudential toolkit to favor climate mitigation.
After peaking in 2007 at around 6% of world GDP, global current-account imbalances declined to 3% of world GDP in the last few years. But they have never left entirely the spotlight, albeit acquiring a different configuration from that which marked the trajectory prior to the global financial crisis (GFC). This is not because they threaten global financial stability, but mainly because they reveal asymmetries in adjustment and post-GFC recovery between surplus and deficit economies, and because of the risk of sparking waves of trade protectionism. They also reveal the sub-par performance of the global economy in terms of foregone product and employment, i.e. a post-crisis global economic recovery below its potential.
There are good reasons to believe that there will be no return to the pre-QE configuration of balance sheets. First, the increasing global financial integration in the last few decades has imposed increasing challenges in terms of making liquidity management effective as cross-border volumes of capital flows have expanded significantly. Second, changes to financial regulation have induced private agents to alter their behavior and strategies. Finally, a new task has come under the purview of central banks: monitoring relationships between various benchmark curves—i.e., operating as quasi-market makers. As a spill-over from abroad, central bank balance sheets in some emerging market economies also bloated. The era of bloated central bank balance sheets seems to be a component of the “new normal”, even if they undergo some diet in the future.