The Davos Forum is so identified with the expansion and strengthening of globalization in the decades in which it flourished, that it could not emerge unscathed from globalization’s partial retrenchment in recent times. Fears about deglobalization must have been predominant.
Multiple shocks faced by the global economy over the past three years have apparently shaken the conventional wisdom on gains from economic integration, and have sparked widespread calls for protectionist and nationalist policies. Is there already evidence of some ‘deglobalization’, or do the factors that underlie globalization remain strong enough despite the shocks? So far, there are no signs of an overall reversal in the long-term trend of greater global trade integration. However, a partial realignment seems to be underway, reflecting the more durable side of those recent shocks. This is probably leading to higher costs and prices on the margin, in the case of realignments done to overcome shocks of a geopolitical nature. The answer seems to be that global trade has been resilient, although it is undergoing some realignment.
An assessment of the implications for growth—particularly the costs—of moving towards a fractured trading system can use as a benchmark what happened during the period of what is usually called hyper-globalization or globalization 2.0 Substantial growth in GDP per capita in emerging markets and developing economies, as well as reductions in poverty rates and lower per capita GDP inequality among countries were major achievements. The transmission channels of the trade fragmentation will be a reversal of the path by which those gains were attained.
The COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine have reignited the debate on efficiency versus resilience in international trade and global value chains (GVCs). This policy brief[ (i) explains the contrasting perspectives of the private sector (primarily seeking efficiency) and the public sector (aiming for resilience); (ii) demonstrates that GVCs are still flourishing, despite some mounting signals of a geo-fragmentation leading to a greater reallocation of the GVCs; and (iii) provides recommendations to help the G20 navigate the balancing act between efficiency and resilience considerations. Domestic policy design in the G20 countries and international coordination among these countries is essential.
The debate on the viability of industrial policy design based on the fragmentation of global value chains, from a cost optimization perspective, did not arise first in the wake of the Covid-19 crisis but was present long before. This industrial policy design was justified by the great development of logistics and transport across the world’s industrial clusters, which allowed just-in-time manufacturing to become the main adopted production model. However, the disruption of logistics supply chains after the advent of the crisis has multiplied the voices calling for a review of the current model of the organization of value chains, in favor of reshoring or nearshoring. This widely shared perception remains rather unconfirmed by the facts. Indeed, it has been observed that the economic sectors that are most integrated into global value chains have experienced a faster recovery than the remaining sectors, which would mean that integration into global value chains can be a factor that accelerates recovery, and therefore guarantees resilience in the event of a major economic shock.
One can expect slower globalization (“slowbalization”) and a greater degree of regionalization. The term “slowbalization”—slowing growth in cross-border flows—can indeed be applied to the trends for goods, capital, and people after the global financial crisis rather than deglobalization—or outright declines in cross-border flows and stocks. The increases in digital cross-border activity also strengthen the concept of "newbalization": the nature and scope of globalization is evolving in the coming years as flows may continue to slow in tangible areas, like the trade of goods, while speeding up in intangible areas, including trade in services and cross-border data flows. On the other hand, “the death of globalization was an exaggerated announcement”.
The Covid-19 crisis has led to major disruptions in Global Value Chains. In this episode, Otaviano Canuto answers questions about the impact on the design of post-covid industrial policies and underlines the components that should be considered by policymakers to ensure a quick and sound economic recovery along with a regional integration that plays a role in this new industrial organization scheme.
Supply shortages during the COVID-19 pandemic have set off a rush to reshore or nearshore production in the name of national security and resilience. But policymakers tasked with shaping new industrial policies should have no illusions that there are shortcuts to economic development.
The crisis recovery has been uneven, unequal, and incomplete, within and among countries. Additionally, we wonder about to what extent the pandemic has accelerated history by reinforcing some previous trends, leading the world to a “great reset”. Among the enduring consequences of the pandemic, four of them are here highlighted: digital transformation has been speeded up; globalization will be reshaped; higher public debt will be a legacy from the crisis; and some economic scarring from the pandemic in labor markets may be expected.
Inequality is nowadays one of the most important issues facing many economies around the world, not only in developing countries but also in advanced and emerging ones. Today, there is a new evidence that has been highlighted by several economists and international institutions and that shows that the fight against rising inequality is not only beneficial from an equity, political and social point of views but it is also beneficial from an economic point of view and can boost economic growth in the long run. In this podcast, Mr. Otaviano Canuto, Senior fellow at the Policy Center for the New South and a former vice-president at the world bank joined our economist Hamza SAOUDI to discuss the root causes behind the increase of within countries inequality and the main policies that African countries should prioritize in this critical time so to ensure a sustained and inclusive recovery.
Commodity prices go through extended periods during which prices are well above or below their long-term price trend. The upswing phase in super cycles results from a lag between unexpected, persistent, and upward trends in commodity demand, matched with a typically slow-moving supply. Eventually, as adequate supply becomes available and demand growth slows, the cycle enters a downswing phase. The latest super-cycle of commodity prices, starting in the mid-90s, reaching a peak by the time of the global financial crisis, and getting to the bottom by 2015, can be seen as associated to the developments of globalization that we have already dealt with in this series. More recently, some analysts have spoken that we might be on the verge of a new cycle, super-cycle or not.
Financial integration of countries and financial globalization led to an extraordinary rise of foreign assets and liabilities as a share of GDP, followed by stability of total flows since the global financial crisis of 2008-2009. The apparent stability has been marked by an underlying metamorphosis of cross-border finance, with de-banking and rising foreign direct investment and non-banking financial flows. Blind spots and potential instability remain.
Cross-border technological diffusion has contributed to rising domestic productivity levels in advanced and emerging economies and facilitated a partial reshaping of the global innovation landscape. However, there are local requisites to escalate the ladder of innovation capabilities.
The global trend towards increasing globalization since the 1990s seems to have had two different distributional consequences: income inequality between countries has declined, while economic inequality within countries has increased. However, technological progress has made the biggest contribution to rising income inequality over the past two decades. Domestic policies – fiscal policies, social protection - are the locus where inequality is to be tackled.
China’s growth trajectory in the second decade of the century has been one of a rebalancing toward a new growth pattern, one in which domestic consumption is to rise relative to investments and exports, while a drive toward consolidating local insertion up the ladder of value added in global value chains also takes place. Services should also keep rising relative to manufacturing. Declining GDP growth rates from two digits in previous decades to 6% in 2019 - and likely lower ahead – would be the counterpart to rising wages and domestic mass-consumption, and to the transition toward higher weights of services and high tech. We point out two major challenges in the rebalancing. First, the transition toward a less investment- and export-dependent growth model has been taking place from a starting point of exceptionally low consumption-to-GDP ratios. Besides high profit-to-wages ratios, low levels of public social protection and spending lead to high household savings. An additional challenge comes from the lack of progress in rebalancing between private- and state-owned enterprises, something that is taking a toll on productivity.