The IEEPA tariff journey did not end well. It turned out to be an illegal tax based on flawed economic principles, was reluctantly revoked under belated legal pressure, and compensated those who were said to be the object of "punishment." The insistence on seeking punishment through other legal means risks extending the fiasco, keeping uncertainty high along the way.
The U.S.–China technological rivalry has become a central axis of global economic and geopolitical competition. While the United States continues to lead in frontier innovation—most notably in advanced semiconductors and artificial intelligence (AI)—China has consolidated strengths in large-scale implementation, manufacturing capacity, and control over critical segments of global supply chains. These advantages are especially visible in clean energy technologies and in the processing and refinement of critical minerals and rare earths. The rivalry now unfolds across multiple frontlines, extending beyond innovation itself to encompass infrastructure, energy availability, and technology deployment across the New South. Its outcome will depend less on breakthrough inventions alone than on each country’s capacity to integrate technology, industrial policy, and energy systems into cohesive national strategies.
This article examines the quiet but profound implications of the erosion of U.S.-led hegemony for small and vulnerable states of the New South. While the post-1945 international order was never egalitarian, it offered predictability: power was organized through law, and sovereignty for weaker states rested less on justice than on procedural stability. Davos 2026 marked a turning point in the public acknowledgment of that system’s unraveling. Statements by leading Western figures revealed not a revolt against American power, but a growing recognition that the United States is increasingly retreating from the obligations that once distinguished hegemony from dominance. As rules give way to discretion, and institutions to transactional bargaining, the capacity of states to navigate global disorder is becoming sharply unequal. The article argues that this shift is existential for small states—particularly in the Middle East and North Africa—whose sovereignty depends almost entirely on international law and multilateral institutions. Unlike middle powers, they lack buffers, leverage, and visibility; their vulnerability rarely translates into voice. Climate change, debt distress, and security dependence deepen this asymmetry, making legal obligation—not power—their primary shield. Far from idealism, international law functions for these states as the infrastructure of survival. The weakening or bypassing of multilateral rules thus constitutes a systemic stress test: not of global morality, but of global stability. If the last line of international law collapses, the resulting order will not be more realistic—it will be more coercive, exclusionary, and ultimately less durable.
What the U.S. has lost in domestic manufacturing, it may have gained in global productive presence. Understanding the transformation of U.S. manufacturing requires an assessment of the revolutionary impact of technology. Tomorrow’s industrial jobs require completely different qualifications from yesterday’s, and even successful production reshoring wouldn't necessarily restore the industrial employment levels of previous decades. Some confusion about U.S. ‘deindustrialization’ also arises from how sectoral GDP is measured. A significant share of value added in industrial production, especially high-value activities, is classified as ‘services’. The deindustrialization narrative, and the political platform of ‘Make America Great Again’ by reindustrializing it, reflects an identification between the evolution of U.S. manufacturing during globalization and the unequal appropriation of economic gains by the top of the income pyramid. The real strategic question for the U.S. isn't how to compete with China in low value-added goods production, but how to maintain and expand its leadership in high-tech segments, design, innovation, and global value chain coordination.
However politically convenient narratives about the United States "abandoning" manufacturing may be, the reality is more complex and less gloomy than many assume. In fact, US manufacturing has not disappeared, but it did internationalize as American companies pursued higher-value opportunities at home.
The heavy financial sanctions on Russia after the invasion of Ukraine sparked speculations that the weaponization of access to reserves in dollars, euros, pounds, and yen would spark a division in the international monetary order. There has been a reduction in the degree of "dollar dominance” with the dollar's share of central bank reserves falling since the beginning of the century. The relative dominance of the dollar appears to be declining but at a very gradual pace.
With loose money supply and low returns in the developed world, emerging markets have become the destination of choice for investors looking for high yields. However, with much uncertainty remaining and inflation well above the Federal Reserve’s target rate, speculation of Fed tapering and market tantrums are gaining momentum. OMFIF is convening a panel to look at capital flows in emerging markets, addressing what happens when the cycle turns, the likelihood of capital flows reverting and asset and currency markets in the developing world.
The International Monetary Fund’s tenth annual External Sector Report (ESR) shows how current account deficits in the global economy widened in 2020 during the pandemic. On the other hand, the ESR also argues that overall, the misalignment between fundamentals and current account balances has not been exacerbated.
More than a decade has passed since the Global Financial Crisis and the age of unconventional monetary policies has not ended. More recently, monetary policy has been eased in 70% of the world economy, negative yielding debt has reached US$ 15 trillion, financial conditions have eased and could ease further. As it tends to happen when very low interest rates and search for yield remain for long, financial system vulnerabilities have continued to build. We may well be on the verge of a new financial crisis. • Where are the key rising vulnerabilities in the global financial system? • Has the rise in debt of emerging and frontier markets spurred by global low interest rates and availability of external finance been matched with corresponding asset creation? • To what extent has heightened trade and policy uncertainty affected financial flows? • What should policymakers do to address rising financial vulnerabilities?
Capital Finance International (Spring, 2019) China’s economic growth has been sliding since 2011, while its economic structure has gradually rebalanced toward lower dependence on investments and current-account surpluses. Steadiness…
Link to video here Council of the Americas, Americas Quarterly, and the National Endowment for Democracy held a deep-dive discussion on China’s new agenda for engagement in the Americas. This…
China’s economic growth has been in a downslide trend since 2011, while its economic structure has gradually rebalanced toward lower dependence on investments and current-account surpluses. Steadiness in that trajectory has been accompanied by rising levels of domestic private debt, as well as slow progress in rebalancing private and public sector roles. As the ongoing trade war with the US continues to unfold, it remains unclear at which growth pace China’s rebalancing will tend to settle.
The US-China trade truce will become a time-out or an armistice pending on China's response regarding technology policy The trade truce between the United States and China, announced…
Global current account imbalances on the rise will likely lead to "currency bullying"
