Read more about the article Central Banks and Inequality

Central Banks and Inequality

As in the period after the 2007-08 global financial crisis, voices have been raised talking about monetary policy and central banks as drivers of income and wealth inequality. The unconventional policies of “quantitative easing” protect the holders of financial assets and value their properties, while workers cross a rough patch on the real side of the economy. Financial markets have disconnected from hardships in the street of commons, with the help of the policies of monetary authorities. Does it make sense to assign an impact of concentration of income and wealth to central bankers' policies? It's complicated...

Continue ReadingCentral Banks and Inequality
Read more about the article Quantitative easing in emerging market economies

Quantitative easing in emerging market economies

The pandemic global financial shock has sparked the inclusion of QE as a policy tool also available for central banks of EME. Nonetheless: - QE targets are on the yield structures of interest rates. If there are fragilities leading to high basic, short-term interest rates, QE will not get much in terms of results. - QE should not raise concerns about “fiscal dominance”, because otherwise it will be self-defeating. Capital outflow pressures may exacerbate. - A prolonged stay of central banks as buyers in local currency bond markets may distort market dynamics. A permanent role of the central bank as a market maker, especially in primary markets, will impair the development of the domestic financial market. Consideration should also be given to the effect of asset purchase programs on possible overvaluation of assets, as well as on collateral availability in the banking system and its impact on the policy rate transmission

Continue ReadingQuantitative easing in emerging market economies
Read more about the article Whither Interest Rates in Advanced Economies: Low for Long?

Whither Interest Rates in Advanced Economies: Low for Long?

The action of central banks has been more reactive than proactive, more reflex than cause, and in their absence, macroeconomic performance would have been even more mediocre than it has been. There is a mismatch between the trend of increasing stocks of financial wealth, occasionally cut by shocks and crises, and the creation and incorporation of new assets accompanying economic expansion. COVID-19 is helping reinforce such trends.

Continue ReadingWhither Interest Rates in Advanced Economies: Low for Long?
Read more about the article The Next Financial Crisis

The Next Financial Crisis

More than a decade has passed since the Global Financial Crisis and the age of unconventional monetary policies has not ended. More recently, monetary policy has been eased in 70% of the world economy, negative yielding debt has reached US$ 15 trillion, financial conditions have eased and could ease further. As it tends to happen when very low interest rates and search for yield remain for long, financial system vulnerabilities have continued to build. We may well be on the verge of a new financial crisis. • Where are the key rising vulnerabilities in the global financial system? • Has the rise in debt of emerging and frontier markets spurred by global low interest rates and availability of external finance been matched with corresponding asset creation? • To what extent has heightened trade and policy uncertainty affected financial flows? • What should policymakers do to address rising financial vulnerabilities?

Continue ReadingThe Next Financial Crisis
Read more about the article Fed Monetary Policy, Inverted Yield Curve and Outlook for US and Global Economies

Fed Monetary Policy, Inverted Yield Curve and Outlook for US and Global Economies

Since the Fed’s July meeting, when the Fed Funds Rate had a 0.25% cut, fears about the impact of the US-China trade war on the global economy have escalated. The US yield curve inversion received much attention as a harbinger of a slowdown in the global and US economic outlooks. We approach here whether lights on next monetary policy events can be obtained from reading the minutes of the Fed’s meeting – and of the July meeting of the ECB governing council – released this week.

Continue ReadingFed Monetary Policy, Inverted Yield Curve and Outlook for US and Global Economies
Read more about the article Fed Monetary Policy, Inverted Yield Curve and Outlook for US and Global Economies

Fed Monetary Policy, Inverted Yield Curve and Outlook for US and Global Economies

Since the Fed’s July meeting, when the Fed Funds Rate had a 0.25% cut, fears about the impact of the US-China trade war on the global economy have escalated. The US yield curve inversion received much attention as a harbinger of a slowdown in the global and US economic outlooks. We approach here whether lights on next monetary policy events can be obtained from reading the minutes of the Fed’s meeting – and of the July meeting of the ECB governing council – released this week.

Continue ReadingFed Monetary Policy, Inverted Yield Curve and Outlook for US and Global Economies
Read more about the article Capital Flows and Deleveraging in Emerging Markets

Capital Flows and Deleveraging in Emerging Markets

Capital outflows from emerging market economies have substantially accelerated since last year. Some analysts have taken those features as pointing to a high likelihood of a “third wave” of the global financial crisis, this time centered on emerging markets. While arguably their combination may acquire a disorderly nature and materialize systemic risks to those economies as a group – and therefore to the global economy going forward – there are also reasons to expect the significant portfolio rebalancing at play not to lead to a disruptive break.

Continue ReadingCapital Flows and Deleveraging in Emerging Markets
Read more about the article Secular Stagnation: A Working Pair of Scissors Needs Two Blades

Secular Stagnation: A Working Pair of Scissors Needs Two Blades

There is a core divergence among some “Keynesian” and “Schumpeterian” economists who have proposed such stagnation hypotheses; each camp points to different underlying factors for continued anemic levels of growth. “Keynesians” argue from the demand side, and believe that proactive fiscal policies are needed for a strong recovery, while “Schumpeterians” believe that the necessary force of creative destruction has continually been stymied by such policies.

Continue ReadingSecular Stagnation: A Working Pair of Scissors Needs Two Blades
Read more about the article Crisis Recovery: Flying on a Single Engine

Crisis Recovery: Flying on a Single Engine

Countercyclical moves by policy makers might have reduced the length and size of the observed output gap had fiscal policy operated as a countercyclical tool complementary to monetary policy. Regardless of whether restrictive fiscal policies have been a necessity or an option, the fact is that they have constituted a major factor leading to a subpar recovery performance.

Continue ReadingCrisis Recovery: Flying on a Single Engine